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FOREWORD
This study was performed under Contract NAS8-30849 for
the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center of the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration under the direction of James R.
Turner, the Contracting Officer's Representative. The final
report consists of two volumes:
Volume I - Executive Summary
Volume II - Technical and Cost Analysis
Additional documentation in the form of working papers
and drawings have been provided to Mr. Turner. Inquiries regard-
ing this material may be addressed to the following individuals:
Mr. James R. Turner, COR/lOSS Study
NASA Marshall Space Flight Center
Attention: PD-24
Huntsville, Alabama 35812
Telephone: (205) 453-4165
Dr. Gary D. Gordon
Communications Satellite Corporation
COMSAT Laboratories
22300 Comsat Drive
Clarksburg, Maryland 20734
Telephone: (301) 428-4517
Supporting information was prepared under a parallel
study, Integrated Orbital Servicing Study for Low-Cost Payload
Programs, Contract NAS8-30820. Inquiries regarding this material
may be addressed to Mr. Turner or to:
Mr. Wilfred L. DeRocher, Jr., lOSS Study
Martin Marietta Corporation
Denver Division
P.O. Box 179, Mail No. 0402
Denver, Colorado 80201
Telephone: (303) 979-7000
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I. INTRODUCTION
The main conclusions and results of this study are
presented in Volume 1, Executive Summary. Included in this
second volume are some of the details and background used in the
study. The organization of this volume is based on the tasks
given in the Final Study Plan; that is, each of the major sec-
tions in this volume corresponds to a separate task.
This study was done in parallel with a studyl performed
by Martin Marietta. Close coordination was maintained between
the two studies by phone, mail, and monthly coordination meetings.
The results of the two studies complement each other, and this
report should not be studied without the corresponding report
written by Martin Marietta.
The opinions and conclusions in this report were gener-
ated in the course of this study. They should not be construed
as official COMSAT policy. COMSAT has made no commitments about
on-orbit servicing.
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II. REVIEW OF PREVIOUS MODELS AND STUDIES
NASA MISSION MODEL
The Shuttle Systems Payload Data (SSPD),2 prepared in
1974, has been used throughout most of the studies. The spacecraft
descriptions contained therein represent a large collection of data
and have been quite valuable to the study, particularly in the
evaluation of servicing. Within the limitations of the time avail-
able, some evalua1:ion of the adequacy of the model for the purposes
of this study was made. The broad picture given by the model is
valid and useful, but some of the details are outdated or inade-
quate. Where necessary, minor changes have been made. The next few
paragraphs summarize some comments on the details of international
communications sa-tellites, the use of a rigid flight schedule in
evaluating servicing, and the predicted number of operating
satellites.
The section on international communications satellites
has been read critically, since COMSAT is the manager of the
INTELSAT system of satellites. According to the references,
information on the international communications satellite has
been obtained from Lockheed and from an Mel application, As a
potential bidder, Lockheed has done extensive work on a future
INTELSA~' satellite, yet it is hardly a prime source of information.
The numt.er of operating satellites is listed as greater than or
equal to one; actually, the required number today is four. It is
likely to be larger in the 1980's, and certainly will never be
less than three. INTELSAT satellites should be positioned in
orbit over the three ocean areas, while the U.s. domestic satellites
will be positioned over North America. Ten deployed antennas are
listed. While there may be as many as 10 antennas, the number that
require deployment will be minimized, and probably will be no more
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than five. All passive thermal control is listed; actually, heat
pipes or louvers may be required.
For the propulsion system, both hydrazine and cesium
ions are listed. Although electric propulsion is being seriously
considered, it is by no means certain. (Servicing is more attrac-
tive for an all hydrazine system since large amounts of fuel are
required for N-S stationkeeping.) A 4400-W electric power system
is listed. This value is too high, and a value between 1000 and
2000 W is far more likely. In the 12/13-GHz band, twenty-four
36-MHz channels are listed; although this may be a good guess, no
one really knows what will be done in the 1979 to 1991 era. While
a single TV link is listed for each 36-MHz channel, by that time
it is likely that two TV signals can be put through one channel.
One difficult question to resolve in evaluating servicing
is whether the number of flights will be held constant or allowed
to vary. If it is held constant, then at some particular time the
satellite will either be replaced (expendable mode) or fixed (ser-
vicing mode). For most of the analysis in these studies, the number
of flights has been held constant. Although this is not necessarily
the best way of evaluating servicing, it was the only way to perform
the evaluation with the time and data available. The problem in the
study of allowing flexibility in the number of flights is that it
requires going back in each program to the basic philosophy that
sets the required number of flights, which is quite a task.
In some of the studies the advantages of more frequent
servicing have been investigated, particularly those associated
with exchanging modules while the satellite is still able to per-
form its mission. At the moment this increases the cost (relative
to the cost of not performing a service mission at that time),
but there are some benefits in terms of reducing the cost per
servicing and improving spacecraft reliability.
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NUMBER OF COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES MAINTAINED IN ORBIT
A key parameter in the study of on-orbit servicing is
the number of satellites in orbit. For communications satellites,
an independent estimate has been made and compared with the SSPD
data. The total is about the same, but details differ; the com-
parison is given in Vol. I, Executive Summary. The details and
reasons are given in the following pages.
The following is an estimate of the average number of
communications satellites (operational or in-orbit spare) main-
tained in geostationary orbit from 1982 to 1991. The Russian
satellites and the u.S. military satellites are excluded, but
NATO and SKYNET satellites are included. The basic categories
used here are from the SSPD document. A total of 45 satellites
has been estimated as follows:
International Communications Satellites 9
Domestic Satellites 10
Disaster Warning 2
Traffic Management
Civil Transoceanic Aviation 3
Maritime Carriers 4
Foreign Communications 12
DOMSAT "C" - TDRSS 3
Communications R&D 2
The above includes most of the non-DOD satellites in geostationary
orbit. In addition to the communications satellites, the SSPD
includes half a dozen earth observation geostationary satellites.
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International Communications Satellites
The present configuration for active INTELSAT IV inter-
national communications satellites is 2, 1, 1; that is, two over
the Atlantic, one over the Pacific, and one over the Indian Ocean
basin. The policy is to have one spare in each ocean; the total
now required is seven satellites.
Most of the present studies are taken only to 1985.
These require a series of INTELSAT IV-As to be launched starting
in late 1975, followed by rNTELSAT Vs in the late 1970s. The mini-
mum configuration, a 2, 1, 1 configuration, would require larger
capacity satellites to handle the expected growth in traffic. The
maximum configuration is 5, 2, 3. This configuration would require
the least growth in individual satellite capacity, but more com-
plexity in traffic assignment and earth station capabilities. The
median approach, and the one adopted for this estimate, is a 3, 1,
2 configuration, which has been widely studied for the period up
to 1985. For this configuration with three additional in-orbit
spares, the estimated number of satellites is 9.
Domestic Satellites
This category includes all communications between earth
stations in the United States (a combination of the DOMSAT "A" and
DOMSAT liB" categories in the SSPD document). The DOMSAT "A", based
on a filing by the American Satellite Corporation to the FCC
(1/23/73), was a small 576-lb (261-kg) satellite to be launched in
the 1979 to 1983 period. The DOMSAT "B", based on a filing by
Mcr and Lockheed, was a large 3200-lb (1472-kg) satellite to be
5
launched in the 1984 to 1991 period. Both programs have large
unknowns, and it is difficult to distinguish between an "A" and
a "B".
There are three domestic satellite programs that provide
some information on future figures. Western Union has filed for
three locations, and already has two WESTARs in operation. RCA
has filed for four locations, and is presently building the
satellites that wlll soon be launched by a Delta 3914 rocket. The
COMSTAR satellites, soon to be launched by COMSAT for use by AT&T
and GT&E, represent the set of heavier communications satellites.
COMSAT has filed for three locations, and growth in this area is
to be expected. While there are numerous other plans for future
programs, some individuals doubt that there will be enough traffic
growth to support them all. An estimate of 10 comestic satellites
appears reasonable.
Disaster Warning Satellites
The mission objective is to provide NOAA with an inde-
pendent mass communications system for warning the public of
impending disasters and issuing bulletins for corrective action
to protect lives a.nd property. The SSPD estimate of two satel-
lites in geostationary orbit is left unchanged. Recent information
indicates that the satellite may be dropped and a chain of terres-
trial VHF radio stations (at 162.55 MHz) may be used for the warning
network.
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Traffic Management Satellites
Plans to use a satellite for providing tracking, control, And
weather information to civil transoceanic aviation are presently
being made by the European Space Research Organization (ESRO) and
,
by COMSAT. Initially, this service would cover the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans, which would require a minimum of two satellites.
A spare satellite, or an Indian Ocean satellite, would increase
the required number to three. If the program is successful, the
number may easily grow to four by the end of the next decade. For
the present, an estimate of three is taken for AEROSAT.
There are two programs for satellite communications to
maritime carriers. COMSAT will soon be launching a MARISAT that
will be used initially by both the U.S. Navy and maritime carriers.
Service is planned for the Atlantic and Pacific, with two satellites
initially. This number will probably grow to at least three, with
a spare or with one over the Indian Ocean. In addition, Europe is
developing its own satellite through the MAROTS program, which will
have at least one satellite. Whether the American and European pro-
grams later combine or continue separately, an estimate of four
satellites for maritime carrier communications appears reasonable.
Foreign Communications
While it is difficult to predict the future of foreign
communications satellites, there is no doubt that this category
will continue to grow. Some countries are planning to have their
own satellites; these are summarized in Table 1. Under the TELESAT
program, Canada has two ANIKS which are quite successful. Japan
will soon have at least two more, one for broadcast and one for
communications. Germany plans to have a TV broadcast satellite,
and Indonesia will buy two satellites of the ANIK type. In addi-
tion, foreign military satellites include the NATO and SKYNET programs.
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Table 1. Purchase of Communications Satellites
(launched or under contract)
~
Country Program Number
Canada TELESAT 2+
Japan 2
Indonesia ANIK + 2
NATO NATO III 2
UK SKYNET 2
Other countries are now renting transponders from INTELSAT
or have filed applications for rental (see Table 2). Several of
these countries will have their own satellites in 10 years or the
number of INTELSA~~ satellites will grow to handle this service.
Brazil already has four earth stations and plans for more. Other
countries, not listed in Table 2, such as Australia, Iran, Pakistan,
have some interest: in satellites. While it would be technically and
economically feasible to provide this service with a small number of
satellites, for rE~asons of politics and prestige many of these coun-
tries may choose to have their own satellites. An estimate of 12
satellites is made, which includes both those countries desiring to
buy and those desiring to rent.
8
Table 2. Rental of Communications Satellites
(renting from INTELSAT or filed application)
Cost per No. of AnnualCountry Transponder* Transponders Cost(M$) (M$)
Brazil 3.24 1 3.24
Algeria 1 2 2
Zaire 1 1 1
Spain/Mexico 1 I 1 1
U.S. (COMSAT) 1 I 1 1I
i
Philippines 1 ! 1 1!
i
Malaysia 1 ! 1 1
Norway 1 I 1/2 0.5
I
*3.24 M$/yr is for "non-interruptable service"; 1 M$/yr uses
spare capacity for "interruptable service."
DOMSAT "C" Satellites
This category was based on the tracking data relay satel-
lite system (TDRSS), which assumes two operational satellites and
one on-orbit spare. NASA is continuing with this project, although
plans for funding will require congressional approval. The program
estimate of 3 satellites is retained here.
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Communications R&D Satellites
At present there are no firm plans for a U.S. advanced
technologry communications satellite. Nevertheless, Canada has the
Canadian technology satellite program (CTS), France and Germany
have launched SYMPHONIE, Europe has another advanced satellite (OTS),
and Italy is moving ahead with the SIRIO program. It appears rea-
sonable t:hat similar programs will continue in the next decade, and
with the possibility of regenerating a U.S. program, an estimate of
2 satellites appears reasonable.
DEMONSTRATIONS OF MODULE EXCHANGE
A few observations can be made concerning the EOS demon-
stration 3 at Goddard and the Bell Aerospace demonstration 4 at
Buffalo last year. In both cases the work was well done in view
of the budget limitations.
a. Hardware demonstrations are useful for evaluating on-
orbit servicing.
b. The automation by Bell Aerospace is preferable to the
manual operation of EOS.
c. The benefits obtained from TV, as used, were not worth
the cost in dollars, complexity, or bandwidth. (Bell
Aerospace did not use TV for module exchange but for
rendezvous.)
d. The reliability of the module exchange was poor in both
cases. While this was understandable in terms of budget,
demonstration of reliability will be necessary before
servicing is really sold to many projects.
e. Both deInonstrations used horizontal withdrawal of modules.
For tesi:ing on earth, vertical withdrawal of modules
might be better. Requirements of testing may influence
the choice of module exchanger.
SERVICING THE DSCS-II WITH THE STS
A detailed study of the servicing of a communications
satellite in geostationary orbit was done by TRW for the Air Force.
This study was of special interest because it dealt with the advan-
tages of servicing for a specific ongoing program, and because the
mission of this program was communications satellit.es, in line with
COMSAT's expertise. Several reports were received, including the
final report, and COMSAT attended both a presentation by Abe Fiul
on the East Coast and the final presenta·tion at SAMSO on March 11.
After the final presentation, the attendees were invited to stay
for informal discussion with TRW participants. Bot:h Martin Mari-
etta and COMSAT took maximum advantage of the invitation; points
were clarified on various parts of the study.
Costs and availabilities had been calculated in this
study. The cost comparison was influenced greatly by the treat-
ment of availability. If the effect on availabilit:y was ignored,
costs of the serviceable mode were comparable to or higher than
those of the expendable mode. On the other hand, if systems of
equivalent availability were compared, especially for high values
of availability, servicing became more attractive in the cost
comparison.
A Monte Carlo simulation had been done using a relia-
bility model for the spacecraft and specified criteria indicating
when the spacecraft was considered operable. The computer simula-
tion provided information on the required frequency of servicing;
thus, it was useful for calculating both the costs of operating the
system and the system performance in terms of availability.
The study was impressive in terms of both performance
and depth, yet it apparently resulted in no definitive conclusion.
It certainly did not state that servicing was not cost effective;
rather it tended to favor servicing. On the other hand, it did
not prove conclusively to those involved in military communications
11
that on-orbit servicing should be implemented. This is indicative
of many space pro9rams: although on-orbit servicing is cost effec-
tive, there is no urgent need for implementation, and its use may
be delayed for many years.
SUGGESTED METHODS OF SERVICING
The suggested methods of utilizing the STS for servicing
automated spacecraft have been reviewed. Most studies consider
fairly standardized methods. Spacecraft are designed to be ser-
viceable by modularized design. In low orbit servicing is performed
by the orbiter; in high orbit it is performed by the tug. Costs of
these methods have been estimated, and the totals compared. The
studies conclude that these methods are technically feasible.
In terms of cost effectiveness, the variety of methods
studied is limited. While a low-cost method can be chosen from
those studied, the most cost-effective method may not be found.
The following are some alternative methods of servicing; more dis-
cussion is given in other parts of this report:
a. free flying servicer for multiple servicing,
b. servicing of operating satellites that have not yet
failed,
c. reduction of initial satellite redundancy,
d. low-cos1: refurbishing without complete subsystem
inspection and testing, and
e. use of servicing to improve system performance
(e.g., availability).
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III. APPLICATION OF SERVICING TO COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES
Due to COMSAT's experience and the unique position of
communications satellites in the NASA mission model, a special
analysis of the servicing of these satellites was made. Parti-
cular emphasis was given to the benefits of servicing for inter-
national communications satellites because this system has been
in existence for a number of years. Requirements for other com-
munications satellites are similar, and conclusions are applicable
to the approximately 40 communications satellites expected to be
in geostationary orbit in the 1980s. In addition, a few other pay-
loads, especially earth observations satellites at geostationary
orbit, have similar requirements.
Much of the analysis of communications satellite ser-
vicing has been given in the Executive Summary, Volume 1 of this
report. That summary also described the design of a serviceable
communications satellite. Some of the analysis that led to that
design is in this section. Since waveguide connectors are essen-
tial to a modularized serviceable communications satellite, an
analysis was made to ensure that such connectors are feasible.
The design presented here is not intended to be the only possible
design, nor necessarily the best, but simply one possible way of
building waveguide connectors into a module.
The availability of a communications satellite is an
important measure of the satellite system performance and the bene-
fits of servicing. The last sections of this chapter include the
requirements for satellite availability, the present methods used
to achieve such an availability, and some proposed new methods for
achieving this availability. While servicing is one method of
achieving a desired performance, it is not the only tool available.
Other ways of achieving the desired results must be compared with
servicing for an overall evaluation of on-orbit servicing.
THE ON-ORBIT SERVICER/SATELLITE INTERFACE
The means by which the on-orbit servicer can dock with
a satellite and their effect on the satellite design are described
(Figure 1). The advantages and disadvantages of the docking face
location are also reviewed. Table 3 and Figures 2-12 review the
impact of the location of the docking face. There does not seem
to be an easy way to dock, exchange modules, and undock from a
spinning satellite (see Figures 10-12).
An attempt has also been made to indicate the impact of
the docking location upon the satellite layout. In most cases the
structure would be quite different from today's designs. It seems
that docking in the region of the center of mass is preferable in
terms of attitude control; however, this requires balanced fuel
consumption to eliminate imbalances and causes loss of pointing
accuracy during servicing. If the center of mass argument is
abandoned, docking can be done on corners or other places, thus
giving access to the north and south faces (Figure 7).
A possible new satellite design is the split satellite
approach (Figures 8 and 9). Once on-station, the satellite divides
into north and south boxes. Each has its own north and south view-
ing faces for thermal radiators, thus doubling this valuable area.
The servicer docks between the halves and services either half or
both halves, as required. In the center post version (Figure 9)
the docking device is on a threaded shaft. The device may be
rotated through 180°, thus permitting the servicer to approach in
the b, c, or d plane. It is also possible to dock in one plane
(e.g., c) and undock in another (e.g., d).
The energy requirements of the various approach planes
have not been analyzed. Tug retrieval information may be found in
NASA/MSFC 68M00039-3. Further thought reveals that the east, west,
earth, and anti-earth face dockings may use a common approach plane
if the satellite is rotated about the pitch axis (also called orbit
normal or N/S line). This pitch rotation would also permit the use
14
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Table 3. Docking Face Location
IX>cking
Face
Existing Equipment
Requirements
the Face
New Limitations
Imposed by Dock i ng Advantages Disadvantages
See
Conclusion Fig.
No.
BODY-STABILIZED SATELLITES
Earth Viewing
Anti-Earth b
Antennas, Sensors
Primadly thermal
RF/IR blockage. etc.
May lose center of
spacecraft as far as
mounting equipment
Surface is
generally io-
acti ve (pre-
viously used
for AKM)
Significant
Docking may be
in region of
solar array
thru-shaft (if
used). Only
one layer of
modules.
Avoid
Acceptable i 2
East and West c and d
Anti-Earth
(one end or
one edge)
Anti-Earth
(Multiple
Corners)
b
I
>1
(same) Long length of ser- (same) Docking may be Acceptable 1
vicer arm in region of ~CS
(same) Shorter ser- Weight of added Acceptable I If
vicer arm; docking; more I
greater access docking maneuvers I
(same) Satellite becomes Surface lS Two sides for i Acceptable I 5
long along the loca.l generally In- eaS1er ! I
vertical ax.l.s. Stow- active; med- (E and w)
ing the antennas In ules may be
the shroud may be d two deep
problem.
Access to only ","55 6
one face is Acceptable
allowed. Lim-
ited N/S area
for radiators
Significant Avoid 7
(same)I 1
b
c or d
e and/
or f
East or West
(not bOth)
North and/or
South
Split Satel-
lite
Anti-Earth
Split Satel-
lite
Center post
I
--------t----,---r---
I Thermal
Satell it.C! may be I Surface is
more planar (flat generally
" square) I inactive
------+----j---+--------j-----------t-------t--------+----I'---
.i 1-; Solar Panels and Solar panels must bE- I
radiators ~~~:~t~o~:~: ~~::~~~~.
Dumping heat 15 a I
problem. j + -+-__-+__
Scissors Jack needed Doubles the Docking ring is 8
to separate satell j te N-S radiator "soft." Added
halves. Some radia- Oou- complexity and
tors see one another bles the mod- structure
ule area.
Separates the
antenna farm
I (better for
I phased arrays
rand i nt<~r-
ferometers)
----------~!,----------------~------~-+-----~f------+___---j---
I (same) Telescoping rods (same) (same) 9
needed to separate- i Servicer can
satellite halves. I pivot around I
Center post ~s I post (about !
threaded in dockinq i 1800 ) and thus
area. Some radia- have greater i
_____---' ~_--_~~--_t_o_r-s-se-e-o_n-e--a-n-o~th--p-r._.a_c_ce_s__s_me_.a_n_s_.~-~--_--_+----+---
SPIN-STABILIZED Si\TELLfTCS
Anti-Antenna
end
(same) Need to transfer spin Module
from satellite bodr ring
to its antenna far:-n
whi ch may f1 y apart.
Docking with a POor
rotating body
and momentum
transfer. Cannot
be used with dual
spin <;;atell i tes.
10
PoorerAccess. Cannot
servlce spun
equ~pment.
Lots of antenna
(and thermal)
Antennas must be Dff- i service the
set and counter- I despun part of
--l. ~... ba1ance~ t.:a~~~~~:~~n
Solar Array . Equ.l.pment must be ----------------I-s-am-e-)----+-p-oo-r-e-s--t-~~1-2=-
I clustered near Difficult
, I
'
Ii access doors I approach; un-
ba lanced when
docked. How to
. ~il_____ I~ _'__u_nd_o_c_k_o _'_ .L-__
Antenna end
Side (s) of
drum (spiral)
·See Figure 1
ORIGINAL PAGE ill
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Figure 2. Docking Face
Anti-Earth (Center)
Fiqure 3. Docking Face, Anti-Earth
(One End or One Edge)
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(Multiple Corners) *
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Figure 5. Docking Face
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18
Figure 6. Docking Face,
East or West
*Docking device could be relocated to the
corner opposite to solar array drive.
Figure 7. Docking Face,
North and/or South
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of different approach and departure directions. For a preliminary
configuration, docking at the center of the anti-earth side was
chosen (Figure 2).
CONFIGURATION
A body-stabilized communications satellite has one side
(with antennas) always facing the earth; solar panels are contained
on the north and south sides. Most modules should have areas on
the north or south faces for thermal considerations. The prime
candidates for docking faces are the east, anti-earth, and west
faces.
A preliminary configuration for a serviceable communica-
tions satellite is shown in Figure 13. The docking would be done
on the anti-earth side, and the modules would be extracted in that
direction. All the modules would have an area on the north or
south faces which would be used for thermal control. The main
thermal design considerations are as follows:
a. north/south radiators for each module, 20 to 30 W/ft
using second surface mirrors;
b. east/west surface insulation integral with the spacecraft
structure;
c. earth/anti-earth insulation integral with the module;
d. module removal from the anti-earth side;
e. heat transfer preferably through some means other than
thermal contact conductance;
f. radiation coupling from high- to low-power modules;
g. heat pipes permitted within a module, but probably not
between modules;
h. electric heaters to maintain spacecraft temperature
between module failure and servicer arrival; and
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i. favorable sun angle maintained by the solar array drive
during servicing, or by the servicer if the array drive
is being serviced.
~
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Figure 13. Preliminary Configuration for a
Serviceable Communications Satellite
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The impact of spacecraft thermal design on the servicer
is as follows:
a. the servicer must maintain replacement module temperature
before transfer,
b. the servicer must dock before significant spacecraft
cooling, and
c. the servicer may have to supply power to spacecraft
heaters for temperature control.
PROBLEMS OF THERMAL DESIGN AND ATTITUDE CONTROL
Redesign of the spacecraft subsystems to permit satellite
servicing will present some major problems. Thermal design seems
to be a prime concern. In the usual (expendable) design, satel-
lites of this type are designed with the north and south faces
as the heat-rejecting radiators and the other four faces more or
less adiabatic. Thus, all dissipative components are in thermal
communication with the radiators. In a satellite with replaceable
modules, this may not be possible. For a module to be easily
changeable, it must somehow be removable. Thus, there must be
contact surfaces between the module and the satellite. This type
of joint offers contact resistance to conductive heat flow. In
the usual application, this type of joint is kept under high
pressure with many mounting bolts and often has grease or other
soft material in the interface. Some thought will have to be
given to thermally self-contained modules with the radiator sur-
face on the face of the satellite looking away from the earth.
Problems concerning the attitude stabilization and control
system will also have to be solved. This may be a good argument
for the use of zero momentum or reaction wheel stabilization systems
rather than biased momentum systems. The docking itself may de-
activate the reaction wheels and desaturation thrusters. In a
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biased momentum system, a high-speed wheel (4000-5000 rpm) takes
two to three hours to spin down upon removal of motor power.
WAVEGUIDE CONNECTORS FOR MODULES
The design of the serviceable communications satellite
shows nine modules requiring waveguide connectors. The receiver
is contained in one module, which would require up to eight con-
nectors. This may cause problems and require some system changes.
The eight transmitter modules require up to four connectors: two
for input and output at the standard 4/6 GHz, and in some cases
two more for the 11/14-GHz input and output. These connectors
would have to make and break a number of times.
Typical requirements for the waveguide connectors would
be power loss (dissipative), as low as 0.01 dB, low radio frequency
interference (leakage), and low VSWR loss (0.01 dB). The require-
ments would depend on the actual application and relative location
of the modules. Leakage from the transmitter output connectors
could Cause radio frequency interference (RFI) at the receiver
input connectors. A research and development program to build
and operate connectors at various power levels and measure leakage
would be useful.
A configuration using a flexible waveguide in the module
is shown in Figure 14. The main point in this design is that the
moveable parts are in the module, which can be replaced, and the
rigid parts are in the spacecraft. The flexible waveguide intro-
duces increased losses, but allows the use of alignment pins for
precise alignment of the two waveguide sections. The various wave-
guide parameters of interest for an advanced communications satel-
lite of the early 1980s are listed in Table 4.
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Figure 14. Waveguide Alignment Compensation Device
Table 4. Waveguide Sizes
Wave Waveguide Wall Ali1nmentFrequE~ncy Length Size, Internal Thickness To erance
(GHz) (in. ) (in. ) (in. ) (in. )
4 2.95 2.29 x 1. 45 0.064 ±0.005
6 1.. 96 1. 59 x 0.795 0.064 ±0.004
11 1.. 02 1. 020 x 0.510 0.064 ±0.003 I
14 0,,91 0.750 x 0.375 0.050 ±0.003 I
The conventional type of waveguide connections are
shown in Figure 15. The soldered-sleeve type of waveguide joint
is fixed and cannot be disconnected. The flange type of waveguide
joint has a number of screws or bolts to hold the waveguides to-
gether. While these can be very low-loss components, they are
not suitable for replaceable modules.
For a connector suitable for a module, with easy connect/
disconnect capability, some gap is to be expected between the two
parts. For static and rotating RF joints, a choke coupling, such
as that shown in Figure 16, is often used. Most of the RF energy
that leaks through the gap into the cavity is reflected, due to
the dimensions of the cavity, and not absorbed. For rotating RF
joints the total insertion loss has been less than 0.2 dB.
Based on the principles discussed above, a waveguide
connector using a flexible elastomer to provide the force to
push the two surfaces together was designed. One design is pre-
sented in Volume 1, the Executive Summary. A similar design
using a spring tension plate is shown in Figure 17. While these
designs provide some assurance that waveguide connectors for
serviceable satellites can be built, the actual building and
testing of such connectors will provide additional confidence
in their technical feasibility.
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Figure 15. Waveguide Couplings
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assumed to consist simply
This section explores
and shows that their
ON-ORBIT SERVICING AND SATELLITE DOWNTIME
The use of the revenues lost as a measure of the "cost"
of a satellite outage has been examined. Too frequent outages
result in the loss of customers.
The use of route diversity (e.g., via a terrestrial com-
petitor) may be limited for some systems and impractical for
certain classes of service (e.g., wideband).
The impact of outages is most severe on the services
requiring wider bandwidths. These same services, due to economies
of scale, return a lower revenue per unit of bandwidth.
It is unrealistic to assign the entire down-time budget
to a satellite. Customer-to-customer links include local loops
and earth stations as well as a satellite. A proposed outage
budget is included.
Satellite failures may be catastrophic (e.g., loss of
attitude control or burned-out traveling wave tube) or gradual
(e.g., degradation of solar cells or thermal control surfaces).
In either case some or all of the telecommunications circuits
being carried via the satellite may incur an outage (service fail-
ure) unless remedial action is taken. These circuits may be
restored by switching in redundant onboard equipment, by "pointing
over" all the earth station antennas to a spare satellite, or by
diversion to another facility.
The "cm:,ts" of outage are often
of the loss of revenue during that time.
other effects that result from the outage
impact may be more' severe.
Telecommunications services may take various forms:
a. telephony,
b. telegraphy (including Mailgram),
c. narrowband data (e.g., 4800-9600 bps),
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d. wideband data,
e. television,
f. facsimile (including telemail),
g. leased lines (with any of the above services), or
h. restoration for terrestrial facility outages.
Grade of Service
The public has grown accustomed to high-grade terrestrial
service. The Bell system claims a 99.98-percent reliability (long
haul). The recent AT&T data-under-voice tariff has reduced this
figure to 99.9 percent. The time allowed for outages is shown in
Table 5.
Table 5. Outages and Reliability of Service
Average Maximum Outage
Reliability (rounded to the nearest minute)
(continuity of service)
per month per year
99.9% 43 min 8 hr, 44 min
99.95% 22 min 4 hr, 22 min
99.98% 9 min 1 hr, 45 min
99.99% 4 min 52 min
A domestic satellite must compete directly with services
having these reliabilities. A failure that causes an outage in
excess of that shown in Table 5 may result not only in the loss
of revenue during that period, but in a loss of confidence by the
customer. If the customer becomes sufficiently dissatisfied, he
will go to another common carrier; thus, the long-term revenue
losses are many times that of the outage.
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Outage Effects
In the case of voice and low-speed data (e.g., 2.4 kbps) ,
a short outage may cause the customer to hang up and try later.
If that fails, an alternative route (e.g., dial-up via a terres-
trial connection) may be possible. In most instances, the public
telephone network (AT&T) and private line services must be kept
isolated for tariff reasons; therefore this approach may be limited.
Higher speed and wideband data (e.g., 50, 128, 240, and
1544 kbps) , represent special problems. A user with four 9.6-kbps
data streams may use four individual circuits. If one circuit fails
he still has three data streams. If, however, he multiplexes the
four streams into one 50-kbps circuit (for economy or flexibility)
and loses that circuit, he has no remaining capacity. This problem
is shared by all forms of communication. On the other hand, if he
is using a wideband data link to tie two or more computers together,
he must provide s1:orage, forward error control, and retransmission
time (if required).
The tolerable bit error rate (BER) for voice (typically
10- 4 ) is not useful for data, which requires a bit rate of 10- 6 or
more. Fortunately, the BER of satellite services may be made very
high, since only one in-orbit repeater is required (as opposed to
one repeater per :30 miles for terrestrial microwave links).
In television services the timing and duration of the
outage are important. An outage occurring just as a sporting team
is about to kick a tie-breaking goal has a different impact than
an outage occurring at the start of the game.
Although it is impossible to relate circuit bandwidth,
outage, and lost customers, it appears that the more demanding
services may require a disproportionately higher reliability.
These services are often supplied at a lower price per unit of
bandwidth due to the inherent economy of scale of wideband opera-
tions. Thus it is misleading to equate the "cost" of an outage to
the lost revenue.
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Outage Allocation
Experience indicates that about one third of the minutes
of earth station to earth station outage is attributable to the
two earth stations; the remainder is attributable to the satellites
and the links between the satellite and the stations. An additional
allocation should be made for local distribution links (from the
earth stations to customer's premises). A proposed budget is given
in Table" 6.
Table 6. Outage Budget
Service Reliability (%)
Outage Source
99.9 99.95 99.98 99.99
One Satellite 4 hr, 37 min 2 hr, 19 min 55 min 27 min
Earth Stations (2) 2 hr, 20 min 1 hr, 10 min 28 min 14 min
Local Loops 1 hr, 47 min 53 min 22 min 11 min
Maximum Time 8 hr, 44 min 4 hr, 22 min 1 hr, 45 min 52 minper Year
Reliability
The performance of COMSAT and INTELSAT systems is evalu-
ated on the basis of a figure of merit known as continuity of
service, or the percentage of time during which circuits are
operating satisfactorily. It is computed using the following
formula:
Operating Circuit Hours - Circuit Hours of Outage 10
Operating Circuits Hours x 0
This is availability from the customer's viewpoint; notice that
outages of excess capacity are not included.
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This can be comput:ed for the earth station or the satellites. For
overall performance the most meaningful computation is based on
the earth station-to-earth station link, which includes the satel-
lite. COMSAT, as Management Services contractor for INTELSAT,
reviews this type of performance data continuously and publishes
a quarterly report of statistics concerning the global (INTELSAT)
communications system. For the third quarter of 1973 and the first
quarter of 1974 the continuity of service is shown in Figures 18
and 19, respectiv(~ly. These figures show that the 5-year average
was 99.96 for U.S. to U.S. service and 99.87 for the global system.
It should be emphasized that this includes both earth station and
satellite outages so that the satellites alone are even better.
It should also be realized that this is required and achieved per-
formance over five years.
Figure 19, which shows some 1974 data, also shows the
dramatic effect of a satellite outage. On March 21 all traffic
carried through the major path satellite in the Atlantic region,
INTELSAT ~V F-7, was interrupted because of an apparent malfunc-
tion in the electronic despin control system in the satellite
antenna. All services were restored via the Atlantic region spare
satellite, INTELSAT IV F-2, 2 hours and 13 minutes after the
interruption occurred.
AVAILABILITY REQUIREMENTS AND FEASIBILITY
If increased availability were available at a modest
cost, a higher value would always be sought. Although there are
no clear-cut requirements for availability, the availabilities
actually achieved in the past may be used as a guide. The pre-
vious section indicated the availability from one U.S. earth
station to another U. S. earth station, including not only the
outages due to the satellite, but also those due to failures of
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Earth Station-to-Earth Station
the earth station equipment. These availabilities ranged from a
low of 99.91 percent in 1970 to a high of 99.99 percent in 1972.
An availability of 99.99 percent is equivalent to a
I-hour outage during the course of a year. While there will be
variations in the method of calculation and the particular com-
munications satellite system which is chosen, an availability of
99.99 percent is a reasonable goal for many systems. Such an
availability can be achieved with a satellite with 99.99 percent
availability. However, it is usually achieved with a less reli-
able satellite (availability of the order of 99 percent), an in-
orbit spare, and a means of switching from one to the other.
For tradeoff studies, it would be useful to know the
financial value of increased availability. This cannot be
defined precisely, but an order of mangitude estimate is $10 M/yr
for an increase of availability from 99 percent to 99.99 percent.
The value is far more than just the loss of revenue due to the
outage. If a satellite revenue of $10 M/yr is assumed, an avail-
ability of 99 percent implies only a I-percent outage, or an annual
loss of revenue of $100,000.
A better estimate is obtained by considering that one
country is willing to pay $3.5 M for the "non-interruptible" ser-
vice of one transponder instead of the $lM paid by other countries.
This is roughly equivalent to stating that a high-availability
satellite might generate revenues of $35M as opposed to the $lOM
a year generated by a low-availability satellite. Thus the high
availability i,s "worth" $25M a year. Another estimate can be
obtained from the fact that many systems assume an in-orbit spare.
Thus, instead of obtaining revenues from the in-orbit spare of the
order of $lOM a year, a premium of $lOM a year is being paid to
increase the availability of the operating satellite. That is, the
improvement in availability is worth $lOM a year. Similar arguments
concerning the desirability of route diversity, through both multi-
ple satellites and through cables, lead to estimates that high
availability is worth of the order of $lOM per satellite per year.
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Present Methods of Achieving Availability
When the satellite ultimately fails, the system is main-
tained by replacing satellites. Hence, many steps have been taken
to ensure high availability in the present communications satellite
system. These include quality control, testing, redundancy, and
failure ~~arning. Satellites are built of components that have been
carefully built, selected, and tested. The basic foundation of any
satellite is the inherent reliability of its parts. A testing pro-
gram is maintained before, during, and after manufacture to pinpoint
failure Inechanisms as soon as possible. The final test of a satel-
lite includes thermal vacuum testing and vibration testing that
often uncover several weak points.
Redundancy, which is a basic tool in the design of satel-
lites, starts with the basic elements, such as a diode. At a higher
level, a subsystem, such as an earth sensor or traveling wave tube,
may be redundant. Frequently the entire satellite is also made
redundant by including an in-orbit spare. The basic equation for
the resulting redundandy, R
s
' is
nR = I - (1 - R)
s
where R is the component reliability and n the number of redundant
components. At present satellites probably have subsystems whose
availability rangl~s from 0.95 to 0.99. Introducing 2-for-l redun-
dancy and then combining all the subsystems in a reliability model
makes it possible to achieve satellite availabilities of 0.99. If
it is desired to increase the availability of a single satellite
to 0.9999,it will also be necessary to increase the availability
of components by two orders of magnitude.
While the derivation of this equation is simple, it rests
on a basic assumption that the probability of failure in one com-
ponent is independent of failure in a parallel component. This
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assumption does not hold for design failures for which the corre-
lation may be high. Putting two components in parallel has proved
useful, but additional components should not be added without fur-
ther analysis.
Other Ways of Achieving Availability
New techniques are probably necessary to increase the
availability of a single satellite to 99.99 percent. Four methods
are suggested here. While these methods are not necessarily new,
they have not yet been implemented to full advantage.
In spite of years of development, there are still a few
weak areas in communications satellites. Notable examples are
nickel-cadmium batteries, mechanical bearings, and traveling wave
tubes. One method to improve availability is to focus on those
problem areas. Hence, research has been done on alternative tech-
niques. Nickel-hydrogen batteries are more lightweight, and in
addition, tests so far indicate that they have higher reliabilities
and longer life. Magnetic bearings still need development, but
may be the ultimate answer to bearing problems in space. Solid-
state amplifiers have been worked on for years, although it is
still doubtful that they can replace all traveling wave tubes.
While the advantages of these new developments have been publicized,
not enough weight has been given to their effect on satellite
reliability.
Testing on the ground uncovers many defects, but the
ultimate test of a satellite occurs when it is launched. Another
method of improving availability is to launch the first satellite
two or three years before the system is really needed. Then any
design defects can be detected and corrected in the remainder of
the program. At this point the temptation to add other improve-
ments in the satellites must be resisted. While such a program
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appears difficult to implement in practice, a number of programs
have been rather expensive because the schedule does not allow for
design defects to be eliminated from the second, third, or fourth
launch. Figure 20 depicts a schedule in which one satellite is
launched two years early. The other four satellites can then take
full advantage of the investigation of any design problems that
showed up on the first satellite.
To achieve the maximum improvement from redundancy,
failures must be independent. A third way of improving availabil-
ity is to procure redundant subsystems from different manufacturers.
When subsystems are procured together, they are based on the same
design, and usually have components from the same lot. The effect
of a 10-percent correlation in failures for fourfold redundancy is
R = 1 - 0.1(1 - R) - 0.9(1 - R)4
S
as illustrated in Figure 21. The curve starts off with the four-
fold redundant values, but the resultant reliability is never more
than one order of magnitude greater than that of no redundancy at
all. For components with a 0.99 or 0.999 reliability, fourfold
redundancy with 10-percent correlation is not even as good as
twofold redundancy with O-percent correlation. In general, two-
fold redundancy from the same manufacturer is often justified on
the basis of cost savings. However, for additional reliability,
a second manufacturer should be used.
A fourth method of increasing availability is to use
unmanned module exchange at geostationary orbit. Studies have
shown that satelli.te availabilities of the order of 99.99 percent
can be achieved. The values depend on the delays inherent in
servicing a satellite, and shorter delays are costly to implement.
One possibility is to have a free-flying servicer in geostationary
orbit. The costs can be minimized by servicing a number of differ-
ent satellites. 'J'he satellite reliability can be maximized by
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replacing design failures and failed redundant components, and if
a module is available in geostationary orbit (either on the ser-
vicer or in another satellite) a replacement can be made within a
few days.
As the history of past failures shows, a variety of fail-
ures can be expected. There are several indications that satellite
availabilities of over 99.99 percent are required, and that achiev-
ing these values is worth at least SIOM a year. To do this, new
techniques will be needed. Some possibilities include developing
new subsystems, flying a prototype two or three years before launch-
ing a system, improving the effectiveness of redundancy by diver-
sity of manufacturers, and fixing satellites by unmanned module
exchange in geostationary orbit. A comparison study of the cost
effectiveness of these different methods has not yet been made.
For a good appraisal, servicing must be compared against other new
innovative techniques for accomplishing a desired mission.
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IV. ASSESSMENT OF SPACECRAFT SERVICING
The results and conclusions of the assessment of servic-
ing are given in Section V of Volume I. This section gives some
of the background and data that were used in the evaluation. The
use of one type of servicer to service all satellites or various
types of servicers built to service a limited class of satellites
is considered. In addition, criteria used to determine the need
for a servicing operation and the benefits that accrue from ser-
vicing are discussed. Additional details of the past failures of
communications satellites are included, since the occurrence of
servicing is critically dependent on the occurrence of failures.
Finally, the possibility of using proximity sensors for rendezvous
and docking is discussed. While there appears to be no insurmount-
able problem, a more comprehensive survey and analysis of rendezvous
and docking as it applies to unmanned servicing is needed.
SERVICER TYPES
Servicer types may be categorized according to criteria
other than the type of hardware used to accomplish the required
manipulations. A possibly useful alternate means of describing
broad categories of servicers is suggested below (see Table 7).
Boundaries between types are rather vague and a mix of types will
probably develop.
General Purpose Servicer
A general purpose servicer consists of a single system
designed to service all spacecraft types at most altitudes. The
variety of missions to be serviced implies that the rendezvous,
servicer, and module require maximum versatility to be responsive
~
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Table 7. Servicer Types
General Class Manufac- Customer SpacecraftServicer Attributes
Purpose Exclusive turer Exclusive ExclusiveExclusive
Spacecraft Design
Highest Moderate Low Low LowestLimitation
Absolute Development
Highest High Moderate Moderate LowestCost*
Service Cost,*
Lowest Low Low Low ModerateNon-recurring
Versatility Required
of Servicer, i.e. , Highest High Moderate Low Lowest
Complexity
Responsible Agency Govern- Govern- Spacecraft Customer SpacecraftDevelopment
ment ment Contractor Contractor
Servicing Govern- Govern- Spacecraft Customer or
ment ment Contractor Customer Spacecraft
or Customer Contractor
*While there will be some differences in cost, these differences are small compared
to the total cost.
to the needs of a variety of possible users. However, in absolute
terms, a general purpose servicer is impossible; hence, it is in-
evitable that some users will find the compromises made to achieve
generality in the module or servicer prohibitive in terms of
spacecraft design. Additionally, many other users may suffer sub-
stantial inefficiencies.
It appears that only NASA can coordinate the variety of
needs and develop and operate such a service system. The develop-
ment costs will be amortized over a large population, but it does
not necessarily follow that the costs associated with the service
function will be t.he lowest among the alternative types. If the
general purpose servicer is too sophisticated it may tend to drive
recurring costs upward. An aspect which encourages servicer gen-
erality is the possibility of cost sharing of a service mission
among two or more users. This has little effect upon the total
scheduled service cost to a large user, but it does reduce the
cash flow required. In addition, it can markedly improve service
schedule flexibility, and for the small or limited user, make a
service mission economically practical.
Class Exclusive
A class exclusive system consists of a servicer system
designed for a class of spacecraft, such as all geosynchronous
satellites built by all manufacturers. The primary motivation is
to reduce the spacecraft design limitations and the servicer com-
plexity experiencE~d with the general servicer. Meeting the
requirements for a class of spacecraft should involve fewer design
compromises for both servicer and spacecraft. Government develop-
ment and operation is required. The population should still be
large enough to amortize developments, while a less ambitious ser-
vicer will reduce recurring costs.
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Manufacturer Exclusive
A manufacturer exclusive system is one in which servicer
and modules are designed to service satellites built by one manu-
facturer, for example, the ANIK series, including MARISAT and
WESTAR. The spacecraft manufacturer is in the best position to
determine the modularization strategy and the best way of imple-
menting it with minimum penalty in terms of spacecraft design. Of
course, only a manufacturer expecting to participate in a variety
of programs could implement such a system, and then he would do so
only if he perceived a competitive advantage. This type may
represent the natural evolution of the spacecraft exclusive type.
In this, as well as the following types, it is assumed that govern-
ment has developed and demonstrated the fundamental principles of
servicing. Future service operations could be done by the con-
tractor under contract to the user, or the servicer could be
delivered to the user for his operation.
Customer Exclusive
A procuring entity has several spacecraft programs of a
sufficiently narrow class to "design" a service system that is
optimum for and exclusive to his needs. This approach requires
the customer to assume the primary responsibility, but presumably
this responsibility is offset by improved competition among con-
tractors during procurement. The customer may be required to
perform most of the standard spacecraft design himself, hence
reducing the contractor's role to that of a fabricator. The large
commercial customer may elect this approach if servicing can improve
his competitive position in terms of mission costs or flexibility.
The needs and capabilities of several spacecraft manufacturers
must be considered in designing the service system; therefore,
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it will be less efficient than the spacecraft exclusive type. It
is implicit in this approach that the customer will perform the
service function.
Spacecraft Exclusive
A spacecraft exclusive service system is one that has
been optimized for a single spacecraft design. The modules and
manipulator do not require versatility; therefore they (particu-
larly the modules) can be simple and responsive to the spacecraft
designer's needs. The probably low spacecraft population will
make nonrecurring costs a significant element of a service func-,
tion, but the absolute costs of service development can be rela-
tively low because of simplicity through exclusiveness.
SERVICER COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS
Since the service cycle will probably be automated, a
TV link is not mandatory. However, TV is beneficial in terms of
providing confidence in the cycle and would have real value for
spacecraft inspection for partially deployed arrays, degraded
coatings, etc. The more versatile the manipulator, the more useful
the TV link becomes.
Telemetry and command must be fairly complex so that
the entire service cycle can be monitored and commanded. Such
remote ITlanipulations may be ground-commanded, or several service
cycles can be stored onboard the servicer and initiated from the
ground. A hybrid providing both capabilities appears desirable.
The rout.ine service cycles can be stored onboard, while more
sophisticated functions can be handled from the ground such as
fault detection and diagnosis.
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It appears that the servicer and servicer function may
require special telemetry capability points on the spacecraft that
need to be monitored only during servicing, e.g., latch indicators,
proximity sensors, and others that may overload a conventional
spacecraft telemetry system. The servicer may not only have to
mechanically dock, but also to provide an electrical interface
with the spacecraft for these additional telemetry channels and
possibly support power as well. The spacecraft telemetry system
may occasionally not provide sufficient data for fault diagnosis
from the ground. It is possible that the servicer could carry a
diagnostic module to be inserted in the spacecraft. Such a module
would permit a more refined checkout than would be possible by
using the telemetry link; at the very least, it might reduce the
amount of telemetry to be transmitted. In any case, it appears
that the servicer would require some communications capacity.
TIMES OF SERVICING AND BENEFITS
The decision as to when to service a communications satel-
lite will depend on the state of health of the satellite, the bene-
fits to be obtained from servicing, the cost of servicing, and
perhaps on when the servicing can be done. The state of health of
a communications satellite can be classified as follows:
a. not serviceable,
b. not functioning,
c. reduced performance,
d. reduced reliability,
e. limited lifetime, or
f. perfect health.
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Some of these classifications overlap, and yet each class is fairly
distinct.. At present, most studies concentrate on servicing satel-
lites in the "non-functioning" category (class b), but there are a
number of satellites in classes c, d and e. In fact, a majority
of recently launched communications satellites are probably in these
categories.
It may be useful to describe these states and to give a
few examples. A "'non-serviceable" satellite cannot be serviced;
it may be in a spin, it may have a non-operational docking or ren-
dezvous target, or it may have a failed non-replaceable unit. A
"non-functioning" satellite can no longer perform its main mission;
it is of no benefit unless it is serviced, and if availability is
important, the servicing is urgently needed. A "reduced perform-
ance" satellite may have lost some transponders, some gain in its
RF output, a telemetry channel, or eclipse capability, for example.
While it may no longer meet specifications, it is still a useful
satellite, and may be meeting all the present performance require-
ments. A "reduced reliability" satellite (class d) still provides
full performance, but for some reason the probability that something
will go wrong has increased; examples are a design failure on
another similar satellite, a loss of redundancy, or a warning that
some component is not quite normal (quite possibly on batteries or
bearings). A "limited lifetime" satellite is similar to the above,
but its reliability over the near future has not changed; perhaps
the only clear-cut example is fuel depletion.
The possibilities of servicing satellites in classes c, d,
and e should be investigated for the following reasons:
a. availability can be vastly increased,
b. the number of servicing operations can be increased,
c. urgency of servicing can be reduced, and
d. costs per servicing operation can be reduced.
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Servicing is not a question of "either/or"; instead, there are
various gradations between servicing only complete failures and
servicing all satellites with anomalies.
The usual study has taken a reliability curve that shows
the probability of failure (class b) and assumed that servicing
is performed when the satellite has failed. Theoretically it would
be possible to use a reliability model of the satellite to predict
when servicing would be desirable for these other modes. However,
even if this were possible, it would probably not be desirable
because servicing on demand is expensive and probably not neces-
sary. A better procedure would be to assume that servicing will
be done at a certain frequency (for example, once a year). This
could be in addition to servicing on demand when a total failure
occurs, but the frequency of this service on demand would be reduced
because of the maintenance cycle. The reliability model could then
be used to find the satellite availability, and the frequency of
module exchange could be based on this maintenance concept.
HISTORY OF FAILURES
A previous COMSAT report 4 to NASA on Contract NAS 8-30285,
"Assessment of On-Orbit Servicing of Synchronous Orbit Spacecraft,"
included a table entitled "Typical Communications Satellite Fail-
ures." This table, with an added column of comments, is shown as
Table 8.
As noted in the table, apogee motor failures caused an
INTELSAT II to fail to achieve orbit. An INTELSAT III satellite,
F-8, also experienced failure during apogee motor firing and did
not achieve synchronous orbit. In addition, of the eight launches
in the INTELSAT III program, two satellites failed to achieve orbit
due to launch vehicle failures. Launch vehicle failures are not
noted on the table.
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Table 8. Typical Communications Satellite Failures
Satellite Component Failure
SYNCOM, INTELSAT II, III Apogee Motor
INTELSAT II Fuel Linea
INTELSAT IV Thruster
INTELSAT III, TACSAT Structural Bearings
NIMBUS Solar Array Bearings
INTELSAT II Solar Array Degradation
INTELSAT II, III, TELSTAR Battery
INTELSAT IV
INTELSAT III
lNTELSAT III
SYNCOM
TELSTAR, COURIER
EARLY BIRD
RELAY, TELESAT
~~
H
8~~. E:
£>~d_
~. I""""t; ~'~li
VI
~~
INTELSAT III
DSCS-2
INTELSAT IV
ATS-S
INTELSAT III
INTELSAT IV
WESTAR-l, SMS-l
! Earth Sensor
Receiver
Transponder
Telemetry
Decoder
Fuel Depletion
Power Conditioning
Deployable Structures
Telemetry Beacon
Attitude Control
Low Orbit
Receiver
Low Orbit
Type
Design
Design
Design
Design
Design
Design
Random
Design
Random
Design
Random
Random
Design
Wearout
Random
Design
Random
Design
Random
Design
Design
Reparable
No
Probably
Yes
Difficult
Difficult
probably
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Comments
INTELSAT II motors had a cold nozzle
Hydrogen peroxide system not completely
passivated'
Not properly designed for thermal soak
back·
Exact trouble not fully known. complex
design.
Low battery voltage during eclipse
jDetector noise level on some sen~orsgradually increased causing beam-pointingerrors on INTELSAT IV INTELSAT III had
an off-axis response.
Tunnel Diode Amplifier
Poor manufacturing quality control on
transistors
Telemetry Antenna
Failed during launch
Under performance of launch vehicle that
was compensated for with onboard pro-
pUlsion
Intensive investigations point to cathode
degradation in the low level traveling
wave tubes
Component failure in Thor/Delta DIGS
L--.....- _L~,..~_ .._ I,_.~._'._~_ I
It should be noted that, with the exception of the despin
bearing, structure, and apogee motor subsystems, INTELSAT satellites
have no single point failure modes which will terminate the mission.
Thus the loss of an earth sensor on INTELSAT IV is not catastrophic
since there are three earth sensors, two sun sensors, an onboard
clock, and a ground despin control mode. The loss of one receiver
is not catastrophic, since there are four receivers, only one of
which must operate. On INTELSAT IV F-2 one axial thruster was lost,
but there was a redundant one. In fact, there were two independent
hydrazine 3ystems onboard, and the later models have a cross-connect
valve between the two systems.
As a representative group of commercial communications
satellites, the INTELSAT satellites have a very high degree of
redundancy. This has been a prime factor in their remarkable suc-
cess. It has also caused weight penalties. Full redundancy and,
in some cases, 3- and 4-for-l redundancy has been used. This reli-
able design has given good performance.
Over the history of satellite launches, including one
INTELSAT I, three INTELSAT lIs, eight INTELSAT Ills, and five
INTELSAT IVs, four out of the 17 failed to achieve orbit, two due
to launch vehicle problems and two due to apogee motor problems.
It can be presumed that these types of failures will not apply to
future launches with a successful shuttle and tug system. Even
though it still seems technically impossible to have a redundant
spacecraft structure, most structural failures occur during the
launch phase due to high g loading. The shuttle should have a
much more benign loading situation; thus a nonredundant structure
may cause no problems. From this point of view, deployment fail-
ures of deployable members and devices are classified as mechanism
failures rather than structural failures, but this is semantics.
The despin bearing on TACSAT and INTELSAT III caused in-
orbit problems. This joint is the heart of a 2-body or dual
spinner design. It is buried deep in the spacecraft.b04Y (a good
......
'..... -~
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location for thernlal design) and is impossible to replace in orbit.
In addition, there is as yet no good way of making that subsystem
redundant. On the other hand, many of the next generation of com-
munications satellites, such as FLEETSATCOM, the RCA GLOBECOM, the
Japanese broadcast satellite, and the global positioning satellite,
are body-stabilized satellites. The satellite body is stabilized
toward the earth and the solar arrays toward the sun. The stabili-
zation d,evice consists of momentum or reaction wheels in concert
with attitude sensors and onboard thrusters. These devices can be
made redundant (with a weight penalty) and may be replaceable in
orbit, at least much more easily than the despin bearings of a
2-body spinner design. Of course the replacement concept must be
factored into the design from the start, which has not been done
for the aforementioned next generation communications satellites.
As mentioned previously, the successful commercial com-
munications satellites are designed with a high degree of redundancy.
They are also designed for what is known as "graceful degradation."
A good example is the INTELSAT III battery problem noted in Table 8.
INTELSAT III F-6 was launched in February 1970. More than three
years later, in the spring eclipse season of 1973, the battery volt-
age dropped below the required level with both transponders turned
on. In subsequent eclipse seasons, one transponder could be turned
off, thus reducing communications capacity to result in a graceful
degradation rather than a catastrophic failure.
The final point is that this table is representative of
satellite problems of the 1960's and early 1970's. Even Relay,
Telstar, and Early Bird are included. On-orbit servicing will be
applied to communications satellites in synchronous equatorial
orbit in the mid to late 1980's. Device R&D is underway in all
areas to solve the current problems. This study must attempt to
define future satellite subsystems rather than those of the past
or current time frame. Nickel-cadmium batteries which have cycle
life problems may be replaced with nickel-hydrogen or hydrogen-
oxygen cells by that time. Conventional bearinqs may be replaced
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with magnetic bearings; structural bearings disappear on body-
stabilized satellites. Hydrazine tanks, thrusters, and lines may
be replaced with electric thrusters, and traveling wave tubes with
solid-state devices.
Despite all this, the one type of problem that will always
recur is the design failure due to human error. Thus it may be
economically justifiable to design these new, very technically
advanced subsystems in replaceable modules for on-orbit servicing
of modular-type satellites.
DESIGN FAILURES
Data presented in the last sections show that almost
half of the failures that have occurred in communications satel-
lites can be classified as design failures. For convenience in
classification, these are failures for which subsequent analysis
has shown that the actual reliability was lower than the planned
reliability. This may be due to the initial design or to methods
used in implementing the design (quality control). A more detailed
survey of the design failures in three series of satellites has
been made so that conclusions can be drawn for·servicing studies.
The main subsystem failures or anomalies are listed in
Table 9. Note that, in spite of these difficulties, the satellites
were successful; in some cases the problem was not serious enough
to affect the satellite mission and in other cases redundancy or
alternate operating modes were available to remedy the problem.
Each line in Table 9 notes the number of satellites in
which the design failure was observed. The next column shows the
number of satellites in which a replacement module was needed in
an attempt to balance the severity of the problem with the esti-
mated cost of a servicing mission to the satellite. In a number
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Table 9. Design Failures or Anomalies in
Communications Satellite Subsystems
Number Number Total Total
Satellite Component Failures Needing Satellites Satellites
Observed Replacemen t Injected Launched
INTELSAT II Propellant Feed 3 3 }
Relief Valves 3 3 I 3 4Solar Array 1 0
INTELSAT III Structural Bearings 5 5
Receiver 1 1 5 8
Earth Sensor 5 0
INTELSAT IV Receiver 4 4
Thruster 1 1 7 8
Structural Bearings 2 0
Earth Sensor 1 0
Totals 26 17 15 20
of cases, the severity was not sufficient to justify a servicing
mission; yet if the satellite were to be serviced for another rea-
son, that module would be replaced.
The following subsections briefly describe the design
failures.
INTELSAT II
Propellant Supply and Feed System. Improper cleaning
of the fuel system prior to filling left some impurities. This
produced foreign particles that eventually led to thruster system
failure in the closed position.
Relief Valves. The valves that were designed to relieve
the pressure buildup in the tanks (due to decomposition) failed
prematurely.
Solar Array. The solar cell cover failed to cover com-
pletely. The fraction of power lost was far greater than the
fraction of the cell exposed because radiation damage tended to
short circuit the entire cell.
INTELSAT III
MDA. Improper design of the mechanical drive assembly
(MDA) caused an intermittent seizure of bearings that was highly
sensitive to temperature. Heaters installed on later satellites
partially alleviated but did not cure the problem.
Receiver. One receiver failed.
Earth Sensor. Internal reflections produced a response
to the sun at certain angles far from the axis. There was no test-
ing for this problem prior to first launch. It was operationally
solved by switching to alternate modes.
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INTELSAT IV
Receiver. There was a gradual loss of amplification due
to a defect in a cathode of the traveling wave tube. Defects were
present in satellites launched in first year and a half of the pro-
gram, but it is believed that they were corrected in satellites
launched after three and a half years.
Thruster. One thruster failed due to heat soak-back
after the thruster was turned off and then refired. Operational
procedures were changed so that the firing sequence would not be
used. A valve was added on later satellites so that two fuel sys-
tems could be interconnected by ground command.
Earth Sensor. Discrimination circuits against the moon
failed to work properly when sun, earth, satellite, and moon were
in a direct line. The problem was operationally solved by switch-
ing to alternate earth sensors.
On the basis of these statistics, the following average
prediction can be made for future programs: Each new program can
expect three design failures, one of which will be sufficiently
serious to warrant a module replacement. The time at which a
failure has been detected has varied from a few hours to four years.
On the average, a design failure appears about a year after injec-
tion of the first satellite in the program. An additional year or
two is required to identify the cause and procure replacement
modules without the defect.
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PROXIMITY SENSORS
In an earlier study 6 for NASA, COMSAT wrote in October
1973:
"It appears that little thought has been given to
developing an ideal target on the spacecraft. A study
is needed that would develop a variety of targets and
docking techniques so that a better choice can be made.
"As a possible example of a target for a spacecraft,
consider the system shown on Figure 22. For simplicity,
only 2-D motion is considered, although extension to 3-D
is straightforward. On the spacecraft there are two light
bulbs, with a shield in between, so that one is visible
from one side and the other, from the other side. One
bulb has its intensity modulated at one frequency, e.g.,
1 kHz, and the other at a different frequency, e.g., 2 kHz.
The service unit has two solar cells mounted at appropriate
angles. With suitable filters four signals are obtained:
AI' A2 , B1 , and B2 , where Al is the 1 kHz signal from
solar cell A, and A2 is the 2 kHz signal from solar cell A(similar notation for B). The attitude error signal for
the service unit is obtained from Al + A2 - B1 -B2 , and
the translational error signal would be obtained from ~~
A + B1 - A - B2 • This example has the additional
advantage t~at sensitivity would increase when the light is
near grazing angle to both solar cells, and the geometry
can be chosen so that this occurs at the most critical
point of the maneuver, that is, just before docking.
"With two more light bulbs at two additional fre-
quencies and two more solar cells, a 3-D system can be
built. Information on range and yaw error is also present
although it may take more sophisticated circuitry to derive
the needed signals."
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LIGHTS ON SATELLITE
1 kHz 2 kHz
SOLAR CELLS ON SERVICE UNIT
Figure 22. Example of Target for Spacecraft
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Unknown to the author, a few months earlier Alan R.
Johnston of Jet Propulsion Laboratory had conceived and recorded
a similar, but better, cooperative 6-axis sensor. The target,
which would be mounted on the spacecraft, was completely passive.
The following paragraphs describe the concept; more details are
provided in the New Technology Report. 7
"To bring together the position and direction refer-
ences, a composite mirror is proposed, as shown in Figure 23.
The composite mirror contains a retroreflector and two
plane mirrors, which together define an object-fixed co-
ordinate system. Three LED light sources would be mounted
as shown, one operating in conjunction with each reflector
surface. LED 1 operates with the corner reflector as
described above, while LED 2 and LED 3 are reflected
toward the detector module by the two plane mirrors.
Light sources LED 2 and LED 3 are mounted far enough
from the sensor axis that the retroreflector return from
them does not enter the detector. Figure 23 ignores the
complications caused by limited physical size of the
piane mirrors, and by ~he small misalignment of the
return from LED 2 and LED 3 at null. Appropriate shap-
ing of Ml and M2 will be necessary to avoid these
difficulties [this probably refers to M2 and M3--GDG] .
"The two remaining coordinates are azimuthal rotation
about the sensor axis ¢, and linear distance from sensor to
mirror r. Both ¢ and r depend on appropriate combina-
tions of the signals already described. For example,
the detector unit will indicate the apparent direction
R2 of the ray from LED 2 reflected by M2, in terms of
a signal Vx2 . This in turn will depend both on the
orientation af the composite mirror as a unit, shown
as Bx ' and the distance r.
"The signals associated with the three separate
light sources would be obtained from the same detector
assembly. Each LED would be pulsed in turn. The asso-
ciated signal would be separated by means of special-
ized phase detection circuitry which would in essence
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LED 1
o LED3
NORMAL
TO M3
COMPOSITE
MIRROR
Figure 23. Cooperative Six-Axis Sensor
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gate the output i1gnal observed in response to a speci-
fic LED pulse into its own output channel. Considerable
simplification of the detector package results because
the sensitive low level detector electronics are in
effect multiplexed. The range of position over which
this type of sensor will operate is an important ques-
tion, as it determines the volume over which it will
acquire its target reflector. The retrochannel, LED 1,
is expected to have the largest range, and therefore
one expects control to be initiated using only the aX'
a y channels. Control strategies required in order to
reliably bring the manipulator to its sensor null from
any position within its acquisition volume would have
to be developed in parallel with the sensing device
itself.
"The sensing head contains a light collecting
telescope lens, and a detector, tentatively a silicon
photovoltaic cell divided into four electrically inde-
pendent quadrants by etching through the junction layer.
Overall size of the detector package could be of the
order of 2 cm diameter x 3 cm long. An output signal
would be brought out from each quadrant, but for sim-
plicity only two, labeled A and B, are shown in the
figure. An IR filter would prevent room light from
entering the detector.
liThe lens would be positioned to bring a bundle
of light from a distant small area source to focus in
a small spot on the detector. The position of this
spot on the detector would vary with the direction to
the light source. Therefore, the proportioning of the
total light flux between detector A and B would depend
on the angular position of the source with respect to
the axis of the detector package."
It would be desirable to have a sensor that can operate
from initial acquisition to within a few feet, with accuracies in
the latter phase of the order of an inch. At present, orbit deter-
minations can be used to bring the servicer within a kilometer or
so of the satellite without modification of present tracking
methods. The target on the satellite is completely passive and
fairly simple. The accuracy during the final phases of rendezvous
should provide the capability for closing velocities smaller than
those used in most docking maneuvers.
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V. COSTS OF SERVICING
Different approaches can be used to determine the costs
of a pro~rram. One approach is to estimate the cost for each part
of the program and add the results. Another approach is to examine
the totals, determine the driving assumptions, and compare the
totals with other similar cost figures.
During the course of this study, cost figures were gener-
ated by COMSAT, discussed at monthly coordination meetings, and
reported in quarterly reports. Cost figures were also generated
by Martin Marietta, where a very detailed and thorough cost analy-
sis was performed. l Close coordination was maintained between the
two studies, and some suggestions by COMSAT were incorporated into
the material presented in the Martin study report.
Instead of presenting different cost estimates, Table 10
shows estimates based on the Martin data, but from a user's view-
point. The costs per unit are given rather than program totals.
The DDT&E costs ($690M, $24S6M, and $6894M for each column) have
been excluded. For the expendable case the costs are the totals
divided by the number of spacecraft. For the maintenance modes,
the totals for the initial placement of satellites have been sub-
tracted, and the remainder divided by the number of servicing
operations.
The cost:s given in Table 10 are for 7 communications
satellite programs, for all medium- and high-orbit programs (MEO/
HEO), and for all mission models that can be serviced. Thus, for
the first column i:here are 41 initial launches, and 42 (83 - 41)
additional operations: replacements, refurbishings, or services.
For the initial satellites, the cost per spacecraft is $22M plus
an additional $SM for delivery to geostationary orbit. The cost
of refurbishing the spacecraft is $9M for transportation and another
$8M for the rest of the operation. Finally, for on-orbit servicing,
the cost of transportation is $4M and that of the replacement
en
-J
Table 10. Costs Per Unit
(excluding DDT&E Costs)
Communications Medium and Complete
Satellites High Orbit Set
Initial Spacecraft 41 61 93
Total Number Expendable 83 160 340
Expendable (per spacecraft)
Transportation (M$ ) 5 7 6
Spacecraft (M$) 22 31 47
- -
-
Total (M$ ) 27 38 53
------,--- ~.
Ground Refurbishment
(per replacement)
Transportation (M$) 9 11 11
Spacecraft (M$) 8 19 23
- - -
Total (M$) 17 30 34
On-Orbit Maintenance
(per service)
Transportation (M$) 4 5 3
Spacecraft (M$) 11 12 13
- - -
Total (M$) 15 17 16
modules and operations is $llM per servicing. This includes any
additional cost for building the spacecraft to be serviced.
The figures for all the medium- and high-orbit programs
are slightly higher, but fairly comparable. (Transportation costs
for medium orbits include the full charge for a tug.) When the
low-orbi1: programs are included, the transportation costs are
comparable, but the spacecraft costs are higher since some large
spacecraft are included.
It appears to be more cost effective to service a communi-
cations satellite for $15M instead of replacing it for $27M. How-
ever, this satellite is seven years old, and changes may be desir-
able for a new satellite. From a project manager's viewpoint, it
may be necessary to lower the cost of a servicing operation con-
siderably below 50 percent of the cost of a new satellite before
in-orbit servicing becomes attractive. Further studies should be
made to optimize servicing operations and bring the cost per
service below $IOM.
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VI. LAUNCH VEHICLE EFFECTS ON SPACECRAFT
This section discusses the possibility of using excess
cargo bay volume for satellites. Several of the present concepts of
satellite layout must change to exploit the available space.
SPACE FOR SATELLITES
The clear portion of the shuttle cargo bay is 60 ft long
and 15 ft in diameter. The tug and tug/shuttle interface equipment
shall not exceed 30 ft. The length required for the tug/spacecraft
interface adapter can be charged to the spacecraft length B
which is determined as follows:
overall cargo bay length: 60 ft
maximum tug: -30
--
30
tug/spacecraft adapter: -1
--
remainder for spacecraft: 29 ft
The total volume (15 ft diameter by 29 ft long), as shown in
Figure 24a, is about 5000 cubic feet or 1.4 x lOB cm 3 •
SHARING THE SPACE AMONG SEVERAL SIMILAR SATELLITES
The cylindrical area may be divided among two or more
satellites. These satellites need not all be intended for the
same service, but it is anticipated that the present-day grouping
of satellites into similar weight and size classes will continue.
Figure 24b shows two cylindrical sections, while Figure 24c shows
two half-cylinders. An INTELSAT IV is shown in each model.
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For scale purposes the INTELSAT IV-A, COMSTAR (AT&T),
and TACSAT are similar in size and mass. The INTELSAT IV is
slightly larger in diameter than the radius of the cargo bay. It
is also slightly higher than half of 29 ft. Since some redesign
would be needed for a tug launch (e.g., removal of the AKM, and
little or no need for transfer orbit beacon and telemetry data) ,
these problems could be overcome.
NUMBER OF SATELLITES PER LAUNCH
The reported weight of INTELSAT IV F-3 on May 15, 1971,
was 1601 lb. Removing the AKM casing and attaching hardware saves
131 Ib, of which some must be replaced by structure. Based on an
assumed weight of 1500 Ib for an INTELSAT-IV-type satellite and
the current NASA values [1] for the geosynchronous tug capabilities,
the number of satellites per launch has been estimated in Table 11.
with the exception of the case in which the tug exchanges a new
satellite for an old one (deploy and retrieve), multiple INTELSAT IV
class satellites can always be launched.
Table 11. Shuttle/Tug Launch Capabilities
The tug 11ftlng capaclty dlvlded by 5000 ft .
Retrieval Deploy and
Delivery Only (full Retrieve
Only satellites) (each way)
Weight (lb) 6000-8000 3000-4000 2070
Number of Satellites
1500-1b satellite 4-5 2 1(INTELSAT IV)
2000-lb satellite 3-4 1-2 1
2500-lb satellite 2-3 1 --
Average Density*
(lb/ft 3 ) 1.2-1.6 0.6-0.8 0.4
(gm/cm 3) 0.019-0.024 0.01-0.012 0.0064
* j
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If less expensive satellites can be built by using
heavier but less expensive components (e.g., batteries and RF
filters), the total mass of the satellite may increase to 2000
or 2500 lb. In most of these instances, there is still enough mass
to carry two, three, or more satellites per tug. Therefore, it is
concluded that each tug is likely to carry at least two satellites.
Figures 24b and 24c indicate that there is more than enough volume
to house several INTELSAT IVs.
The question of how to handle two (or more) satellites
is important since it affects the size and, more importantly, the
shape of each satellite. The shape of the overall satellite influ-
ences the modularization, which is in turn part of the orbital
servicing study.
SATELLITE SHAPES
Despite the cylindrical envelopes of existing launch
vehicles and the cargo bay, there is a strong trend toward the
boxy body-stabilized structure. COMSAT's studies (see Executive
Summary Vol. I) have evolved toward studies of rectangular boxes
which make module exchange easier. Fortunately the round hole
(cargo bay cross section) is large enough to accommodate the
square or rectangular peg-like satellites envisioned.
The choice between Figure 24b (cylindrical sections)
and Figure 24c (pie-shaped wedges) is somewhat dependent upon
the type of satellite and the tug limitations. As cylindrical
sections are dispensed, the tug/payload center of mass moves along
only the X axis (assuming balanced sections). Dispensing wedges
shifts the center of mass along the Y or Z axis, as well as the
X axis, resulting in a more complex tug stabilization requirement.
Figure 25 shows a rectangular spacecraft to scale for
the sectional dispensing approach. The 15-ft dimension has been
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Figure 25. Rectangular Spacecraft in Shuttle,
Solar Arrays Facing End
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reduced to 12 ft to fit into the ls-ft-diameter envelope. Some
of the lost radiator area may be regained by letting the maximum
dimension be 15 ft and rounding the corners to form a chord with
a 7.s-ft radius. Two or three such spacecraft may fit into the
cargo bay.
Turning the spacecraft on end produces the configuration
shown in Figure 26. The maximum dimension is 29 ft divided by the
number of spacecraft. For two spacecraft this is about 14 ft
(allowing for a separation section between the satellites).
UTILIZATION OF THE VOLUME
Each 15- x 8- x 8-ft satellite occupies about 1000 ft 3 ,
or utilizes about 20 percent of the total volume. This suggests
that a more optimum spacecraft configuration should be possible.
It may be desired to increase the radiator and the module access
areas. This would result in a satellite with a larger volume (but
less density) and hence should reduce the satellite cost (due to
relaxed packaging and layout constraints).
DENSITY
Figure 27 shows the results of a study of spacecraft
densities. It indicates that today's spinning satellites with
body-mounted solar cells fall into the 0.05- to 0.1 g/cm 3 class.
Thus, a 15- x 8- )( 8-ft conventional satellite of this class would
be expected to weigh between 3000 and 6000 lb. This is not the
case, h01flever.
The body-stabilized satellites of the 1970's generally
fall closer to 0.13 gm/cm 3 • The 15- x 8- x 8-ft satellite would
weigh about 8000 lb. Since there is apparently a large amount of
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Figure 27. Spacecraft Densities
of space in the satellites of the shuttle/tug era, a much less
dense design appears not only desirable but necessary to avoid
excessive weight. This is not an argument for more lightweight
materials, but rather an observation that the spacecraft equipment
may be spread out over a large volume because the satellite is
easier (less expensive) to build, operate (thermal), and service
in orbit.
If the 15- x 8- x 8-ft satellite weighed 1500,
2000, or 2500 Ib, the density would be 1.6, 2.1, or 2.6 Ib/ft 3
(or 0.025, 0.033, and 0.041 gm/cc), respectively. This indicates
that the densities may be one-quarter to one-half of contemporary
values.
DATA FROM FAIRCHILD
For comparison purposes a 1974 EASCON paper from Fair-
child is considered. 9 This paper describes two shuttle/tug
satellites (see Figure 28). The first has a drum spinner with a
174-in. diameter and a height of about 6 ft with an assumed weight
in the 2000 Ib class. The other is a serviceable satellite for
which few details have been given. Figure 29 attempts to scale
the satellite on the basis of the scanty information available
and to fit it into the IS-ft-diameter cargo bay.
Several observations may be made from the Fairchild
study:
a. The densities are indeed lower than those of current
practice (roughly 0.013 to 0.03 gm/cm 3 ) and in line
with COMSAT's independent estimates.
b. About two spinning satellites fill up the available
space (but not mass). The body-stabilized satellite
appears to be very thin (a few feet). Seven to ten
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Launch Configuration:
Diameter = 174 in
t
= 71 in
= 1344 lb
II
Length
Weight
,
1 4 543
Mass (lb)
Module Qty. Each Total
l. TT&C 2 39 78
2. RCS 2 160 320
3. ACS 2 79 158
4. Input MUX
and TWTAs 4 58 232
5. Batt. and
Pwr. Dist. 2 89 178
6. RX and
Divider 2 33 66
7. Output MUX
and Feeds 1 52 52
--
Module Total 1084 lb
Figure 28. Fairchild Shuttle-Launched Satellites 9
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*May be substantially deeper than 2 ft when
antennas, waveguides, backboard wiring, coup-
ling, and structure are added.
Figure 29. Fairchild Serviceable
Satellite in Cargo Bay9
79
spacecraft might be stacked within the cargo bay if
the mass limit were not in the range of one to five
(Table 11).
CONCLUSIONS
It appears very unlikely that the weight and volume
constraints will occur simultaneously. The average packing density
(Table 11) differs, by an order of magnitude in several cases, from
current practice (see Figure 28). Figure 28 excludes the antenna
farms which may currently demand a fairing volume as large as the
rest of the satellite. Their inclusion will reduce actual densi-
ties by as much as a factor of two (but not ten) except possibly
in the case of extremely complex, large reflector satellites which
are not presently envisioned.
It may be preferable to make satellites thicker (and
thus make the module "drawers" longer) to better utilize the
available volume.
Because designers have been so long constrained by Centaur
and Delta fairings, round satellites (or hexagonal approximations)
topped with antenna farms are taken for granted. The shuttle/tug
offers large cylindrical sections (or portions thereof, as shown
in Figure 24).
The large lifting capacity of the tug suggests multiple
satellites (Table 11). Since it is unlikely that one user (e.g.,
COMSAT, INTELSAT, Western Union, or NASA) will always want to use
the full capacity of the tug, some form of standardization among
the users is likely to evolve. This will take the form of common
separation/attach fittings, incremental volumes, and eventually
means for on-orbit servicing (even though the modules may not be
electrically interchangeable because of mission-unique requirements).
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Provision must be made for attaching the satellites to
the tug. This may be done by stacking them one on top of the
other (as in some of the military satellites), side by side (DSCS-II),
or in a dispensing fixture (IDCSP). With solar panels and thermal
radiators demanding the north and south surfaces and antennas the
earth-viewing face, the only remaining face pair is the east and
west surfaces. East/west panels could be used both for stacking
satellites (enroute to orbit) and for docking (in-orbit servicing).
This argument favors the configuration shown in Figures 24 and 25
over the Fairchild approach~ if Figure 24b is used. A single
attach fitting (on the east, west, or possibly the anti-earth
panel) would favor the Fairchild concept using Figure 24c.
8-1
VII. GLOSSARY FOR ON-ORBIT SERVICING
This glossary has been prepared for use with geostation-
ary satellites and their communications systems. Many of the terms
are unique to these applications. In instances in which a term may
be defined in several ways, depending upon the satellite orbit or
application, the qeostationary communications satellite usage has
been emphasized.
AKM
Agena
AM
Antiearth
Antisolar
Apogee kick motor (AKM)
Attitude
Axis
Body-stabilized satellite
Centaur
See apogee kick motor.
An upper stage propulsion unit.
Amplitude modulation.
Surface or direction away from the
earth's surface.
Surface or direction away from the
sun, as on the dark side of the
satellite or of the earth.
A rocket used to convert from the
elliptical transfer orbit into the
circular orbit. This motor is fired
at or near apogee and is used for
plane changing and/or orbit circular-
ization by raising the perigee to
equal the apogee altitude.
The orientation of the spacecraft,
which may be expressed in terms of
pitch, roll, and yaw (or i, b, or n) .
A straight line about which a body
rotates, or one of a set of reference
lines for a coordinate system.
Generally a satellite which is sta-
bilized by reaction wheels, momentum
wheels, or jets.
The name of a second stage used for
launching.
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Characteristic velocity
Channel
Circuit
Cross strap
Delta
Disturbance torques
Earth-lock
Earth-stabilized satellite
Earth station
Earth synchronous orbit
Effective radiated power
The energy required to overcome
gravity and place an object into
orbit; see also orbital velocity.
See half-circuit.
A 2-way telecommunications loop con-
sisting of two channels (also called
two half-circuits). The ends of the
loop are at terrestrial locations.
A form of switched redundancy in which
the outputs of two (or more) deviges
may be switched to the inputs of two
(or more) subsequent devices.
Name of a launch vehicle, also called
Thor-Delta; more specifically, the
third stage of the Thor-Delta vehicle.
The effect of the earth's environment
(magnetic field and gravity gradient),
solar pressure, and internal rotating
parts upon the spacecraft attitude.
The process of locking the spacecraft
axes to the local vertical and its
maintenance.
A spacecraft which can keep one of
its axes to the local vertical and
its maintenance.
A terminal on the earth for communica-
tion to a satellite or another body.
An orbit whose period is the same as
the earth's rotation time or 1436.1
minutes. The orbit may be circular
(h = h = 22,300 mi.).
a p
Radiated power (e.r.p.). The product
of the power supplied to an antenna
and the antenna gain relative to a
half-wave dipole (+2.15 dB), particu-
larly in those frequency bands where
a dipole or an array of dipoles is a
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Equatorial orbit
Equivalent isotropically
radiated power (e.i.r.p.)
FDMA
FM
Fuel
Full Circuit
Geostationary satellite
Geosynchronous satellite
Geosynchronous satellite
orbit
useful antenna. Also the product of
the power supplied to an antenna and
the antenna gain relative to an iso-
tropic radiator. (NOTE: The preferred
term is e.i.r.p. See CCIR Xllth Plen-
ary Session, Vol. IV, Part 2, p. 239,
New Delhi, 1970.)
An orbit in the plane of the earth's
equator.
The product of the power supplied to
the antenna for an emission and the
antenna gain relative to an isotropic
antenna.
Frequency-division (or domain) multiple
access.
Frequency modulation.
Propellant for a rocket or a satellite
(including attitude and stationkeeping
control) .
A communications system or equipment
capable of simultaneous transmission
in two directions.
A geosynchronous satellite having an
equatorial (i = 0) circular (h = h i
e = 0) orbit with the same sid~realP
period as the earth (23 hr, 56.1 min)
so that the satellite appears to remain
fixed in relationship to the earth.
See also stationary orbit.
A satellite for which the mean side-
real period of revolution about the
earth is equal to the sidereal period
of rotation of the earth about its own
axis (23 hr, 56.1 min). Also a satel-
lite whose period is synchronous with
the earth's rotational period. See
also geostationary satellite.
The orbit of a geosynchronous satellite.
This orbit has the following unique
properties: P = 23 hr, 56.1 min.
NOTE: The orbit may be elliptical and
still be synchronous.
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Half-circuit
Nutation
Occulation
PCM
Pitch axis
Pitch axis control
Redundancy
Spin stabilized
Synchronous orbit
TWT, TWTA
Up-link
A communications system capable of
alternate transmission but not simul-
taneous transmission in two directions.
A liquid propellant fuel used for
spacecraft.
Wobble of the satellite about its
spin axis.
The interruption of light upon one
body (e.g., the spacecraft) by the
intervention of another (e.g., the
earth).
Pulse code modulation.
The axis normal to the plane of the
flywheel. When the spacecraft is
properly aligned, the pitch axis and
orbit normal are coaxial.
The control used to maintain space-
craft orientation about the pitch
axis so that the principal axis and
the local vertical are coaxial
throughout the orbit.
The inclusion of an extra (spare)
element available in a system for use
in the event of a failure (or removal
from service) of a similar element
Also the portion of the total informa-
tion contained in a message which can
be eliminated without loss of essential
information.
Applies to a satellite which is sta-
bilized by spinning its body so that
the axis of rotation remains pointing
in a given direction.
See earth synchronous orbit.
Traveling wave tube and traveling wave
tube amplifier, respectively.
The earth-to-satellite link.
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